Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation

Backgrounder - BG 09.005 Tri-Command Study - 28 September 2009 (PDF)

Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation (PDF)

Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation
among North American Aerospace Defense Command,
United States Northern Command, and Canada Command

Executive Summary

At the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the Commanders of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and Canada Command (Canada COM) initiated a study to investigate the future roles, missions, and relationships for their Commands, referred to as the Tri Command Study. This Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation among NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM is an initial product of that Study.

NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM share the task of defending North America. USNORTHCOM and Canada COM are national commands reporting to their governments through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and CDS respectively, while NORAD is a bi-national command reporting to both governments through the SecDef and CDS. The Commands have complementary missions and must work closely together to meet their individual and collective responsibilities for the defense and security of North America. NORAD has mission responsibilities in the aerospace and maritime domains while the national commands have responsibilities in the air, land, and maritime domains, including extensive responsibilities to support civil authorities when directed.

The Framework describes how the three Commands operate and interact, highlights fundamental relationships, and underscores command responsibilities concerning mutual support and cooperation. While the Framework deals primarily with operational level military-to-military operations and issues, it also serves to identify future challenges and emerging issues that may require resolution at a more strategic level. The Framework’s immediate goal is to promote enhanced military cooperation among the three Commands.

The three Commands face a common security environment, share common values, and understand the importance of carrying out their duties with a sense of urgency in the face of very real and present dangers. The Commanders continue to establish close relationships among themselves, their staffs, and with supporting and partner agencies. Only in this way can the commands ensure a timely and coordinated response to defense and security challenges to North America, respecting national sovereignty while leveraging the capabilities and common cause they share.

NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM have organizational structures that affect their degree of interaction and interoperability. CDRNORAD has formed his command according to geographic regions for the aerospace warning and aerospace control missions. CDRUSNORTHCOM has service and functional components as well as several standing Joint Task Force / Headquarters to accomplish specific missions. Canada COM is organized regionally with six Regional Joint Task Forces as well as maritime and air functional components, and when required, is supported by Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) and Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM). Commanders may task organize forces differently dependent on the situation.

The organization of the three Commands for air operations is similar and facilitates common understanding and interoperability. The Commands have subordinate air component commanders with multiple, overlapping responsibilities. This organizational and command structure provides flexibility and helps with coordination of activities and information sharing among the Commands.

NORAD and USNORTHCOM are co-located in Colorado Springs and have a predominantly shared headquarters staff. While this makes it easier for NORAD and USNORTHCOM to coordinate efforts, it creates added complexities for Commander Canada COM and his mission partners, and serves to emphasize the need for all three Commands to increase their efforts at true trilateral coordination on those issues that govern the basic operations and relationships of the Commands.

This Framework assesses several of those key issues with the aim of eliminating gaps, tightening seams, and identifying areas where the Commands may require additional clarification. The issues include:

• Contingency and crisis planning
• Operations
• Intelligence sharing
• Information sharing
• Exercises and training
• Working with mission partners

To further the goals outlined in this Framework and within their assigned legal and command authorities and resources available, the Commanders have agreed to a number of actions that will enhance the integration and synchronization of activities and operations among the Commands.

As our military forces evolve to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM will continue to seek cooperative approaches to ensure our nations’ future security and prosperity. We view North American defense and security as a collaborative effort among the three commands and our mission partners. We will continue to work as partners to enhance our ability to act effectively, in a timely and coordinated fashion, consistent with our national interests and sovereignty, to defend and secure Canada and the United States. NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM guard our freedoms, defending and securing our people, our values, and our ways of life. Our nations expect much of us. Our solemn commitment is to continually strengthen the defense and security of Canada and the United States, such that our mutually dependent and interconnected societies continue to prosper in a North American community that is free and safe.

Introduction

1. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and Canada Command (Canada COM) have complementary missions and work closely together to meet their responsibilities for the defense and security of North America. The Commands face a common security environment, share common values, and understand the importance of carrying out their duties with a sense of urgency in the face of enduring natural and manmade dangers. In that regard, the Canada-United States (CANUS) Basic Defense Document (BDD), signed by Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), requires the Commanders of the three Commands to establish close relationships with each other and with supporting agencies to ensure a timely and coordinated response to defense and security challenges to North America.

Purpose

2. This Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation among NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM (hereafter the Framework) supports the Tri Command Study’s stated goal to increase North American defense and security while enhancing the valued relationship between Canada and the United States. The Framework is designed to help the Commands’ efforts toward more seamlessly accomplishing their respective missions while improving overall mission effectiveness and yielding greater efficiencies. It will help strengthen the Canadian and US armed forces’ ability to act in a timely and coordinated fashion; to work in concert with their interagency partners to identify, deter, disrupt, and defeat threats to Canada and the United States; and to provide timely, effective, and efficient support to civil authorities as directed. The Framework’s immediate goal is to facilitate enhanced military cooperation among the three Commands.

3. The Framework describes how the three Commands operate and interact to achieve mission goals. It describes fundamental relationships and delineates existing command responsibilities concerning mutual support, interface, and cooperation. It supports the integration and synchronization of activities and operations when and where appropriate. This document will evolve as the roles, missions, and relationships of the Commands adjust to a dynamic and uncertain security environment. The Commands will review it annually and update it as required.

4. While the Framework deals primarily with current operational level military-to-military operations and issues, it also identifies future challenges and emerging issues that may require resolution at a more strategic level. It identifies seams, gaps, and overlaps; points out areas where ambiguity exists; and identifies other areas where the Commands may require additional clarification.

5. The information in this Framework is drawn from a number of sources, including the Tri Command Study Working Group task analysis, tri-command staff talks, the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG) final report, and lessons learned from operations and exercises. This Framework is consistent with Canadian and United States strategic guidance and policy documents. A list of references is at Annex A.

Shared Security Environment

6. NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM operate in a changing and uncertain security environment and face additional challenges that are fundamentally different from those faced during the Cold War. A range of threats, both symmetric and asymmetric in nature, and present to varying degrees in all domains, presents immediate and future challenges for all Commands. Some threats may occur with very little warning. While asymmetric challenges will pose a more likely problem, the most dangerous threats are strategic attacks from near-peer nation states. The most recent version of the (classified) CANUS Threat Estimate contains a more detailed description of the threat.

7. USNORTHCOM and Canada COM must also prepare to support mission partners in responding to natural and manmade disasters. Disasters such as major hurricanes, earthquakes, pandemics, or the consequences of terrorist attacks can exceed the capabilities of local and state or provincial emergency response assets and require significant use of military resources to help mitigate the effects of and provide support for relief and recovery efforts.

8. Threats may exploit seams and vulnerabilities associated with overlapping organizational responsibilities and capabilities. The Commands must identify and address these deficiencies in order to enhance security and meet the evolving challenges associated with an interconnected world. Achieving a truly comprehensive security posture is our perpetual objective.

Roles, Missions, and Tasks

9. The roles, missions, and tasks of the three Commands, as directed by bi-national agreement and national strategy, are inherently complementary. The Commands share the responsibility of defending North America and have overlapping areas of operation and responsibility. USNORTHCOM and Canada COM are national commands reporting to their governments through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and CDS respectively, while NORAD is a bi-national command which reports to both governments through the SecDef and the CDS. NORAD has mission responsibilities in the aerospace and maritime domains while the national commands have responsibilities in the air, land, and maritime domains (USNORTHCOM also has responsibilities in the space domain). The national commands also have more extensive responsibilities to support civil authorities when directed. Because both the United States and Canada desire to retain unilateral response options to air threats, there is an inherent overlap of responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities between the national commands and NORAD. This overlap requires careful coordination of efforts during planning and execution. More detailed descriptions of each Command’s roles, missions and tasks are in Annex B.

Organization

10. NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM have subordinate organizational structures with similarities and differences that shape the degree of interaction and interoperability. See Annex C for figures depicting these command structures.

1. USNORTHCOM and Canada COM are organized differently to accomplish their similar missions.
   • USNORTHCOM is organized by service components (AFNORTH, ARNORTH, MARFORNORTH), functional components (JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC) and several standing Joint Task Forces / Headquarters to accomplish specific missions (JTF-Civil Support, JTF-North, JTF-Alaska, JFHQ-National Capital Region). Fleet Forces Command is a supporting command to USNORTHCOM. For emerging operations, USNORTHCOM will task-organize its forces differently dependent on the situation.
   • In contrast, Canada COM is organized regionally, with six Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTFs) tasked with conducting all military operations within their assigned region. Commander Canada COM exercises operational command (OPCOM) over all assigned forces, which are normally employed under the operational control of the applicable RJTF Commander. Additionally, for maritime and air operations within the Canada COM Area of Responsibility, Commander Canada COM directs two Maritime Component Commanders and a Combined Force Air Component Commander. Commander Canada COM is supported by Commander CANSOFCOM for the conduct of operations that require the support of special operations forces and receives operational support when required from Commander CANOSCOM.
   • Commanders also retain the flexibility to create a temporary Joint Task Force with an assigned Joint Operations Area to conduct military operations for the duration of a specific operation.
   • The differences in these constructs make it difficult for USNORTHCOM and Canada COM to maintain a habitual relationship at the tactical/operational level because the participants on the US side will vary dependent on the situation and the participants on the Canadian side will vary dependent on location.
2. The organization of the three Commands for air operations is more analogous and facilitates common understanding and interoperability. The Commands have subordinate air component commanders with multiple, overlapping responsibilities.
   • Commander NORAD (CDRNORAD) has formed his command according to geographic regions for the aerospace warning and aerospace control missions. Commander Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) is responsible for NORAD air operations in the continental US (CONUS), Commander Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) is responsible for NORAD air operations in Canada, and Commander Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR) is responsible for NORAD air operations in Alaska. While these regional commands are organized according to national boundaries, NORAD routinely conducts operations across these boundaries.
   • For USNORTHCOM air operations, CDRUSNORTHCOM has designated Commander, Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH) as his joint force air component commander (JFACC) within CONUS. He has also designated Commander Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK) as his subordinate Commander in the Alaskan region with air domain responsibilities.
   • Commander Canada COM has OPCOM for force employment of all air forces excluding forces assigned to other commands such as NORAD, Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. For Canada COM air operations, Commander 1 Canadian Air Division is the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC) to Commander Canada COM.
   • Commander CONR also serves as the Commander AFNORTH, Commander of the USAF’s 1^st Air Force, and USNORTHCOM’s JFACC (except for Alaska); Commander ANR is also Commander Alaskan Command, Commander JTF-AK, and Commander of the USAF’s 11^th Air Force (11 AF/CC, with 11 AF/CC assigned JFACC responsibilities for Alaska); and Commander CANR is also Commander 1 Canadian Air Division and Canada COM’s CFACC. This organizational and command structure provides flexibility and helps with coordination of activities and information sharing among the Commands. While this structure has benefits, it may also be confusing to those not completely familiar with the differences in the three Commands, particularly some non-military mission partners. For operations, the designated supported commander must carefully synchronize activities with the other commands and mission partners involved.

Command Operational Procedures

11. General

1. The ability of the three Commands to act in a timely and coordinated fashion, and in concert with their mission partners is dependent upon close cooperation and liaison among the Commands and all subordinate and supporting commands. Cooperation between NORAD and USNORTHCOM is enhanced due to three practical reasons. First, the Commands have a predominantly shared headquarters staff that is co-located in Colorado Springs. All of the staff directorates, with the exception of the operations staffs (J3s), are dual-hatted with responsibilities to both Commands. This dual-hatted status puts the responsibility for ensuring coordination and collaboration at the director level, usually a general or flag officer or equivalent. Second, traditionally CDRNORAD is dual-hatted as a US combatant commander, previously as Commander US Space Command and currently as Commander USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM). In the event a Canadian is appointed CDRNORAD, CDRUSNORTHCOM will be designated the Deputy CDRNORAD. Therefore, regardless of the country of origin for CDRNORAD, CDRUSNORTHCOM will have a direct influence on NORAD operations and activities and vice versa. Third, CDRNORAD and CDRUSNORTHCOM has published two documents which provide coherent and authoritative strategic direction to both Commands. These documents are the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Vision 2020 and the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Theater Strategy. Other than the BDD, similar documents between NORAD and Canada COM or between USNORTHCOM and Canada COM do not currently exist. While the reasons above make it easier for NORAD and USNORTHCOM to coordinate efforts, they also serve to emphasize the need for NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM to increase their efforts at true trilateral coordination on those issues that govern the basic operations and relationships of the three Commands.
2. Recently, the three Commands have undertaken several efforts designed to further improve cooperation. For example, periodic staff talks are designed for senior leader interaction and provide a mechanism for continued consultations on matters of mutual concern. Also, at the direction of the CJCS and CDS, CDRNORAD, CDRUSNORTHCOM, and Commander Canada COM initiated a study to investigate the future roles, missions, and relationships for the three Commands, referred to as the Tri Command Study. This Framework is an initial product of that Study. As part of an organizational culture change, the Framework will help create an even more collaborative environment among the Commands.

12. Contingency Planning

1. The CANUS BDD (as well as other national guidance documents) directs the Commanders of the three Commands to develop detailed plans for the combined defense and security of Canada and the United States. It further states that the plans are to be developed in cooperation with the other two Commanders and the plans will be reviewed and updated at a minimum every five years. The BDD specifically directs development of two bilateral plans and addresses one bi-national plan.
   • Canada-US Combined Defense Plan (CDP). A classified bilateral plan which provides a framework for the combined defense of Canada and the United States during peace, contingencies, and war. CDRUSNORTHCOM and Commander Canada COM are the designated planning agents of this plan and are responsible for the production of the CDP in synchronization with other national, bi-national, and bilateral plans. This plan is currently under development.
   • Canada-US Civil Assistance Plan (CAP). An unclassified bilateral plan which provides guidance for the military forces of one nation to support the military forces of the other nation that are providing support of civil authorities. CDRUSNORTHCOM and Commander Canada COM are the designated planning agents of this plan and are responsible for the production of the CAP in synchronization with the CDP and NORAD plans. CDRUSNORTHCOM and Commander Canada COM signed this plan on 14 February 2008.
   • NORAD Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 3310. A classified bi-national plan which outlines the concept of operations for the execution of NORAD missions. CDRNORAD is responsible for the production of this plan. CDRNORAD signed the current version of NORAD CONPLAN 3310 into effect on 5 March 2007. NORAD works with USNORTHCOM and Canada Command to:
     • Coordinate safe passage procedures for airborne forces conducting USNORTHCOM/Canada COM missions with NORAD
     • Provide security/force protection for NORAD forces
     • Provide planning support to NORAD when required
     • Coordinate additional tasks
2. NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM develop these plans through a combination of working groups and joint planning teams with representation from across all three Commands, as appropriate. These groups and teams conduct mission analysis, develop courses of action and concepts, brief Commanders and other senior leadership, and complete all documentation. Planners staff the finalized plans through formal coordination across the Commands, and as appropriate with higher headquarters, force providers and other stakeholders to ensure synchronization of planning efforts.
3. In addition to the bi-national and bilateral plans, when tasked by the CDS or SecDef, the Commands conduct coordinated planning for security events such as the 2010 Olympics, the North American Leaders Summit, and other national security events.

13. Crisis Planning

1. The three Commands use similar processes and procedures for crisis action planning. When a crisis occurs, the command or commands involved will convene their battle staffs and various cells or centers that focus on different aspects of the crisis and include responsibilities to:
   • Conduct mission analysis and plan for near term operations
   • Maintain continuity between the various centers and the command/operations centers regarding plans and orders, Commander’s intent, approved end states, and strategic or operational objectives and effects
   • Coordinate with other staff elements and commands as necessary for a complete review and response to the crisis
   • Modify plans based upon the current situation and develop orders
   • Produce messages, reports, orders, briefings, and other documents for decision makers with sufficient detailed information required to make an informed decision
2. For both day-to-day and crisis operations, NORAD and USNORTHCOM share a command and control center, the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2) which enhances situational awareness of events in the NORAD and USNORTHCOM area of operations and area of responsibility. The N2C2 also conducts collaborative information sharing with the Joint Command Centre (JCC) at Canada Command on a 24/7/365 basis.
3. During day-to-day operations, all three Commands are organized in the J-staff construct. Conversely, during crises the Commands are organized under a battle staff construct, as detailed in Command directives. The three main battle staff centers for NORAD and USNORTHCOM are the combined Future Planning Center (FPC) and two separate NORAD and USNORTHCOM Future Operations Centers (FOC). The two FOCs ensure coordination of their activities with liaison positions in each others’ staff.
4. Canada COM employs a Rapid Response Action Planning (RRAP) process when dealing with crises and has similar battle staff entities to those of NORAD and USNORTHCOM focused on current and future operations. Commander Canada COM maintains situational awareness and exercises command and control of routine and contingency operations through the Canada COM JCC.
5. While the staff elements within each of the Commands have developed J-staff relationships with each other for deliberate planning and non-crisis operations, there has been little structured interaction between the NORAD and USNORTHCOM battle staffs and their counterparts in Canada COM.
6. Although the planning procedures among the three Commands are compatible and the interaction among the three staffs can be improved within the existing authority of the Commanders, a limiting factor for military response during crisis planning will be policy level guidance regarding the degree to which USNORTHCOM and Canada COM should organize, prepare, and train to integrate their crisis response. The NORAD Agreement and NORAD Terms of Reference (TOR) facilitate an integrated planning effort and integrated military response for NORAD missions. Similar agreements or early policy decisions for situations not involving strictly NORAD missions could improve the interoperability of USNORTHCOM, Canada COM, and NORAD during crisis planning.

14. Planning Issue Summary

• There are currently two USNORTHCOM liaison officers assigned to Canada COM. Liaison officers offer significant benefits to all commands. Canada COM is developing plans to help mitigate impediments created through distance between Colorado Springs and Ottawa to include impediments to sharing classified information. The goal is to enable NORAD and USNORTHCOM to more quickly gain the Canada COM perspective on operational issues, and vice versa. In addition to facilitating planning among the Commands, liaison officers would provide benefits in all headquarters areas.
• Sharing classified planning information is often a cumbersome and time consuming process which is exacerbated by an insufficient number of interoperable systems among all three Commands. As with the liaison officer issue above, information sharing is a command-wide issue and not just isolated to the planning area.
• Greater interaction among battle staffs could lead to more effective coordination and synchronization of bi-national and bilateral operations. To that end, the Commands need to develop a compatible and practical process for tri-command coordination and synchronization during planning and execution of bi-national and bilateral operations – a process of ensuring compatible, mutually supportive “battle rhythms.”
• USNORTHCOM developed a USNORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan IAW DOD strategic guidance, and a NORAD Campaign Plan is in development. Canada COM has developed the Canada Command Theatre Plan. As the concepts of Continental Defense and Security continue to evolve, the commands should refine their campaign and theater plans as applicable to address mutually supporting end states and objectives. These strategic-level plans may also benefit from tri-command vision and strategy documents that would describe military-to-military strategic end states for enhanced military cooperation.

15. Operations

1. The US and Canada are committed to mutually supporting each other as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but approved bilateral and bi-national plans serve as the basis for CANUS combined operations within that broader context. Should a crisis or situation occur requiring a coordinated response from more than one of the Commands, these plans will be implemented according to the situation and additional orders issued as appropriate.
2. Although Commanders have separate and distinct authorities and responsibilities, when appropriate, they must closely coordinate operations during mission execution. NORAD must coordinate operations planning with the national Commands to ensure situational awareness and synchronization. Likewise, the national Commands should coordinate their plans and operations with NORAD as appropriate. NORAD interacts with Canada COM by providing operational awareness of NORAD activities to the National Defence Command Centre (NDCC) who, in turn, provides it to Canada COM. NORAD has started to include Canada COM on correspondence such as Air Sovereignty Level (ASL) change notices.
3. For defense operations, in addition to the existing NORAD authorities and responsibilities specified in NORAD CONPLAN 3310, the CDS and the SecDef have issued standing execution orders (EXORDs) allocating forces and directing CDRNORAD to respond to specific airborne threats. For other defense operations requiring a coordinated response, the CDS and SecDef will issue specific orders. CDRNORAD is usually the supported commander for aerospace warning and aerospace control.
4. The 2007 North American Leaders Summit (NALS) held near Ottawa highlighted differences in national legislation and responsibilities for security operations. This was the first Canadian Special Security Event (CSSE) held following Canadian Forces Transformation where the CDS assigned Commanders NORAD and Canada COM roles as supported commanders for their respective portions of the overall mission. Planning for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics prompted a review of the enabling legislation for Canadian domestic air security, and clarification of military support to Canadian security organizations is forthcoming.
5. NORAD Maritime Warning. NORAD processes, assesses and disseminates intelligence and information to warn of maritime threats or attacks against North America. When intelligence and information meets established threat criteria, CDRNORAD sends an advisory message to CDS and CJCS, and informs Commander Canada COM and Commander USNORTHCOM, thus enabling Canada and the United States to respond in a timely manner. NORAD maritime warning (NMW) is enabled by information received from US and Canadian sources. NMW differs from other NORAD missions in that NORAD does not have any maritime forces assigned nor is NORAD the organization responsible for the response; therefore, the goal is to ensure bi-national maritime situational awareness so that maritime stakeholders in both the US and Canada have the most relevant and complete picture. Additionally, unlike NORAD’s other missions, NMW is a headquarters only mission.

16. Operations Issue Summary

• The 2007 NALS highlighted areas where command authorities, capabilities, and responsibilities were not sufficiently clear. The assignment of command authorities by the CDS for Vancouver 2010 and the 2010 G8 summit does not imply that two supported commanders will be the preferred command relationship in the future. For preplanned special security events, the CDS or SecDef will assign command authorities within their respective countries. Work is continuing to clarify command and control issues in Canadian security operations to ensure that military support is provided to security events in an effective and efficient manner.
• The compartmentalization of information continues to be an impediment to bi-national and bilateral operations. Operation BURNT FROST, a satellite reentry operation in early 2008, provides an example of a mission where classification issues prevented timely distribution of information not just to Canada COM but to Canadians in NORAD headquarters and operations centers.
• CDRNORAD, with input from Canada Com and USNORTHCOM, decided the NMW mission would be a headquarters only function. As a result, watches and assessment are done in Colorado Springs and not at the NORAD Regions or Sectors. Since NORAD and USNORTHCOM are co-located, sharing maritime information with USNORTHCOM is near-real-time as the NMW watchstander works alongside the USNORTHCOM watchstander. The sharing of maritime information and intelligence with Canada COM takes somewhat longer and is lower fidelity since it is accomplished through phone or email.
• The nature of maritime intelligence, existing in both law enforcement and military domains, creates significant legal and organizational culture considerations. Additionally, information flowing from military intelligence sources, primarily Office of Naval Intelligence and Canadian naval intelligence, is filtered for release to either Canadian or US officials, resulting in a limited picture.

17. Intelligence

1. NORAD and USNORTHCOM intelligence activities are integrated and synchronized as much as possible by virtue of the combined J2 directorate. Likewise, the intelligence activities of the NORAD regions and USNORTHCOM components are integrated and synchronized not only with NORAD and USNORTHCOM headquarters but with national intelligence agencies. Additionally, N-NC/J2 has commenced quarterly VTCs with the NORAD regions and USNORTHCOM component J2s.
2. Canada COM/J2 and N-NC/J2 do not have the same level of integration or synchronization. Because there is a significant disparity in intelligence resources between N-NC/J2 and the Canada COM/J2, N-NC/J2 primarily interacts with the Chief of Defence Intelligence in Canada, which CONPLAN 3310 tasks to provide intelligence support to NORAD. Recognizing that there is a capacity issue, Commander Canada COM has approved a plan to increase the size of the Canada COM J2 staff. This will allow Canada COM J2 staff to interact more effectively with the NORAD and USNORTHCOM J2 staff, act as the Canadian office of coordination for bilateral USNORTHCOM J2 issues, and co-produce a variety of products.

18. Intelligence Issue Summary

• Given the distinct intelligence missions, efforts, and capabilities of the three Commands, there is a significant potential for collaborative intelligence analysis and production of threat assessments. To achieve this collaboration, the Commands should:
  • Improve intelligence systems interoperability to facilitate exchange of intelligence and data
  • Explore use of liaison/exchange officers between intelligence directorates
  • Advocate for national/departmental policies and procedures that facilitate information and intelligence sharing

19. Information Sharing

1. Sharing information is a critical enabler for effective operations between and among NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM. Individually, the Commands share information with subordinate organizations and their respective domestic mission partners fairly well. However, information flow between and among the Commands is currently inhibited by technical, policy, and legal considerations.
2. Each Command uses different computer network systems to collaborate and exchange classified information. Few of these systems are interoperable with the others. Canada COM has extremely limited access to SIPRNet, achieved via a SIPR Rel terminal which provides only email connectivity with USNORTHCOM. The NORAD REL/CANUS system is not commonly used across USNORTHCOM and Canada COM. This lack of commonality and interoperability hampers the timely exchange of information and could delay critical information exchange. Another challenging issue is working in multiple caveat environments (SECRET, REL/CANUS, REL/ACGU).
3. Unclassified information exchange with non-military mission partners is hampered because some of these partners only have access to the commercial Internet. The Commands need to resolve the technical and administrative issues preventing shared access to common mission essential information before collaboration can be markedly improved.
4. The Commands are working to explicitly identify what information needs to be shared between and among them (critical information requirements). They have not yet established and documented common processes and procedures as to what other mission partners’ information needs to be shared, when the information needs to be shared (battle rhythms), and how it needs to be shared (record traffic or non-record traffic).
5. There are mid- and long-term solutions to increase interoperability among all three Commands. In the short term, the Commands need to develop a Tri Command information-sharing directive that includes the basics of information sharing processes and procedures among the Commands. The end-state would be a document that allows us to move toward the establishment of commonality to enhance our information sharing capabilities. A potential model for this document is already being developed among the US Department of Homeland Security, the National Guard Bureau, and the Department of Defense. USNORTHCOM has acted as the facilitator for the development and staffing of this document.
6. USNORTHCOM has overcome some domain and interoperability issues by using a human element called the Information Exchange Broker (IEB). IEBs are senior functional area experts embedded in Battle Staffs who are knowledgeable in operations, communications and information sharing. Their primary function is to foster information flow between their battle staff and all others involved in the operation. They facilitate information exchange, negotiate between various technologies and processes, and identify information exchange impediments. More extensive use of IEBs by the Commands could assist in overcoming many of the short-term process and procedure issues as well as several of the technical issues between the commands. The IEB capability is currently in place within NORAD and USNORTHCOM and has been codified in US joint doctrine and the DOD Information Sharing Implementation Plan.

20. Information Sharing Issue Summary

• Given the criticality of information sharing as an enabler for effective operations, while respecting established protocols, the Commands should:
  • Strive to continuously improve information sharing practices so that information can be provided at the right time and place to become actionable knowledge for decision making, ultimately enhancing the defense and security of North America
  • Explicitly and comprehensively identify the information that needs to be shared, the circumstances under which it needs to be shared; and the common processes and procedures for sharing
  • Resolve technical interoperability issues and computer domain issues with each other and with mission partners to enhance information sharing

21. Exercises and Training

1. NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM coordinate with each other for exercise participation, observer support, evaluations, and After Action Review (AAR) submissions, attendance, and report distribution. Canada COM has a standing invitation to participate in NORAD and USNORTHCOM’s academic training program. The program delineates initial core competency training, directorate-specified functional knowledge requirements, and future leadership development.
2. The unclassified NORAD and USNORTHCOM Learning Management System (LMS) is anInternet-based software application that functions as a repository for academic and training content. LMS is fairly mature and hosts approximately 150 online courses, some of which may be beneficial to Canada COM. Canada COM should be provided access to the current courseware as well as the capability to post learning content, as desired, on the system for distribution across the three Commands.
3. There is a need for improvement in information sharing and collaboration in exercise assessment, after action reporting, and lessons learned corrective action. NORAD and USNORTHCOM exercise AARs are distributed to all exercise participants (including Canada COM as appropriate), but there is limited feedback from Canada COM because of a lack of capacity. Contact has occurred between the commands through the exercise planning and assessment process; this process should continue and routine information sharing mechanisms should be established.

22. Exercise and Training Issue Summary

• Joint software tools (such as the Joint Training Information Management System, JTIMS) need to be established in multiple classification environments (similar to the effort regarding the Joint Master Scenario Events List application). Once established, this would provide a common exercise planning tool for use by planners when appropriate and desirable for combined training. It would also offer improved exercise linkage, better identification of training shortfalls/needs, and improved common training event assessment.
• The three Commands have participated together in several exercises. These were all national level exercises, which required the Commands to be responsive to higher level authorities and/or other government agencies/departments. In addition to the national level exercises, the Commands should conduct more command-oriented exercises which enable them to explore their own relationships.

23. Mission Partners

1. NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM rely heavily on relationships with mission partners who are stakeholders in continental defense and security.
2. NORAD and USNORTHCOM share a single Commander’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) for interaction with mission partners. The JIACG is comprised of resident and non-resident representatives from other agencies as well as representatives from each headquarters’ directorate and special staff sections. The JIACG emphasizes interagency coordination as a process integrated into operations and planning, not a separate function. On behalf of the Commander, the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Interagency Coordination Directorate (N-NC/IC) manages the JIACG.
3. Within the Department of National Defence, the policy-level responsibility for interagency coordination rests with the Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy. Canada COM provides support to security operations only in response to a request from mission partners through any Minister of the Crown, but normally through the Minister of Public Safety who is legally responsible for the coordination of the Whole of Government response. The Department of National Defence, Canada COM, and other representatives of the Canadian Forces are embedded in the Whole of Government governance structure through membership on senior-level committees such as the Assistant Deputy Ministers’ Emergency Management Committee, reporting to the Deputy Ministers’ Security Advisory Committee, which in turn reports to the Operations Committee of the Cabinet. Canada COM is co-located in Ottawa with the other government departments associated with security and has established permanent and semi-permanent liaison officers to assist in coordination. Therefore, from the beginning of any security operation, interagency coordination is automatically incorporated into Canada COM’s operational planning process. As a result, Canada COM has no similar organizational structure to the JIACG and has no requirement for such.
4. Resident at NORAD and USNORTHCOM Headquarters are 16 full-time representatives from non-DOD US federal agencies. NORAD also has liaison officers with the Department of Homeland Security and Transport Canada. USNORTHCOM has established habitual relationships with more than 60 US federal agencies, non-governmental organizations, and private sector entities, and has embedded liaison officers in key mission partner organizations.
5. During contingency operations, N-NC/IC mans the Interagency Coordination Group (ICG) as a battle cell. Resident mission partner representatives and situation-dependent non-resident representatives operate from the ICG providing on-site subject matter expert assessment and rapid reachback to their parent organizations. The ICG produces the daily JIACG Assessment which focuses on anticipating requests for DOD assistance.
6. NORAD has established habitual relationships with US and Canadian federal departments and agencies related to its mission and has a long-standing tradition and critical mission requirement for direct coordination with outside agencies on day-to-day operational issues as required. Traditionally, this has primarily involved Transport Canada, NAVCAN, Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security. During NORAD operations involving either of the national Commands, NORAD will inform the national Commands of ongoing coordination with government agencies.
7. As national military commands, USNORTHCOM and Canada Command (in accordance with their respective national policies and directives) coordinate directly with their respective US or Canadian mission partners at the federal, state or provincial, and local level, as well as with non-governmental agencies and private sector entities operating in their respective Areas of Responsibility.
8. For cross-border bilateral operations, the country providing support will do so directly in support of the military of the other country, after government-to-government approval and guidance, either standing or operation specific. During these operations, it will be the responsibility of the national command of the supported country to ensure that necessary interagency cooperation and coordination is provided in support of the other nation’s forces. Supporting commands will route requests for interaction with mission partners in the supported country through the supported command.

24. Mission Partner Issue Summary

• Some of the gaps in information sharing previously discussed are magnified when it comes to collaborating with mission partners. Effective collaboration is inhibited by the disparate information networks used by NORAD, USNORTHCOM and Canada COM. Regardless of the classification of the information, the majority of the work, information sharing, and communication (including the Task Management System) between NORAD and USNORTHCOM takes place on the SIPRNet which very few mission partners have access to. Another challenge with mission partners is that few civilian agencies, especially below federal level, have personnel with security clearances.
• The Commands should advocate for the development of a Canada-US military and civilian shared information network or other reliable and timely protocols for unclassified, sensitive, and classified information. Current systems significantly limit information sharing options. Commands should place emphasis on use of unclassified systems to the maximum extent possible.

Way Ahead – Actions Required

25. To further the goals outlined in this Framework and within their assigned legal and command authorities and resources available, CDRNORAD, CDRUSNORTHCOM, and Commander Canada COM agree to:

• Continue to foster close relationships with each other and with mission partners to anticipate and ensure timely and coordinated responses to defense and security challenges to North America
• Develop a Tri Command Common Vision and a Tri Command Strategy
• Establish and/or consolidate liaison/exchange officers in each Command and develop appropriate training programs for them
• Develop and deploy a course of instruction for NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM personnel based substantially on this Framework to educate and inform regarding how the other commands operate individually and how the commands work together
• Enhance information and intelligence sharing processes and procedures among the three Commands, to include national and bi-national advocacy for appropriate technical solutions
• Develop a compatible and practical process for tri-command coordination and synchronization during planning and execution of bi-national and bilateral operations
• Share and periodically update Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Priority Intelligence Requirements lists
• Review and revise command operations center and battle staff checklists and other command directives to ensure appropriate and timely information sharing
• Develop more formalized processes for information sharing during deliberate and crisis action planning
• Reinforce the practice of periodic action officer staff visits among the commands, especially during exercises and conferences; continue periodic senior leadership staff talks
• Share education and training processes, best practices, and lessons learned
• Whenever possible, increase command and mission partner participation in table top and command post exercises when and where possible
• In coordination with appropriate mission partners conduct more in-depth analysis of how the three commands should accomplish interagency coordination
• Continue the work of the Tri Command Study in accordance with the CDS and CJCS directed Terms of Reference, until such time as the requirement for a separate Tri Command Study effort is deemed unnecessary

VICTOR E. RENUART, JR.

General, USAF

Commander, NORAD and Commander, USNORTHCOM

A.B. DONALDSON
Vice-Admiral
Commander, Canada COM

Annex A – List of References

1. International Documents

1. Ogdensburg Declaration 18 Aug 40
2. North Atlantic Treaty, 4 Apr 49
3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 19 Jun 51
4. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on the North American Aerospace Defense Command, 12 May 06
5. Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in Comprehensive Emergency Planning and Management, 2 Dec 98
6. Terms of Reference, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 21 Feb 07
7. Memorandum of Understanding between US DOD and Canada DND Concerning Mutual Support, 21 Oct 99
8. The Canada-United States Agreement to Facilitate Cooperation between Military Services of Two Countries (Chapeau) 19 Aug 94
9. Canada – United States Basic Defense Document (BDD), 8 Jul 06
10. Agreement relating to Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between the United States and Canada Agreement on Principles and Procedures for Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces, 13 Mar 68

2. Canadian Documents

1. The Canada First Defence Strategy, Jun 08

3. Department of National Defence Documents

1. B-GG-005-004/AF-005, Use of Force in CF Operations (Rev 1), 6 Jan 02
2. B-GJ-005-300/FP 000, Canadian Forces Operations 2004-11-05
3. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CF Operational Planning Process, 4 Oct 02
4. B-GL-300-033/FP-000, Land Force Command, 21 Jul 06
5. B-GL-300-003/FP-000, Land Force Command
6. Canada Command Direction for Domestic Operations 7 Jun 06
7. Canadian Forces C4ISR Command Guidance & Campaign Plan 2003-12-02, 2 Dec 03
8. CDS 022 071910Z Mar 03 CF Standing ROE for Routine Operations
9. CFAO 20-45, Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between Canada and the United States, 29 May 87

4. United States Documents

1. National Security Strategy, Mar 06
2. National Strategy for Homeland Security, Oct 07
3. NDP-1, National Disclosure Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, 1 Oct 98
4. National Response Framework, Jan 08
5. Unified Command Plan 2008, 17 Dec 08

5. Department of Defense Documents

1. National Defense Strategy, Jun 08
2. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, May 04
3. AR 525-16, Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between the United States and Canada, 05 Jul 73
4. CJCSI 3121.01B, Joint Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules of Force for US Forces, 18 Jun 08 (S)
5. CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats, 28 Feb 06
6. CJCSI 3214.01B, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations, 31 Mar 06
7. DODD 5100.46 Foreign Disaster Relief, 4 Dec 75
8. DODI 8110.1, Multinational Information Sharing Networks Implementation, 6 Feb 04
9. DODD 8910.1, Management and Control of Information Requirements, 11 Jun 93
10. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II, 17 Mar 06

Annex B – Command Roles, Missions and Tasks

1. Uncertainty in the security environment requires the NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM mission areas to be readily adaptable. While the Cold War paradigm of preparing to defeat a traditional super power remains a necessity, NORAD has adapted over time, the most recent change being the acceptance of new responsibilities in the area of maritime warning.

2. USNORTHCOM and Canada COM, relatively new commands, continue to refine mission execution through increased responsiveness and effectiveness and by anticipating the requirement to conduct defense and security missions simultaneously.

NORAD

3. Authorities. CDRNORAD authorities are outlined in the NORAD Agreement and the NORAD Terms of Reference.

4. Area of Operations. CDRNORAD does not have an assigned Area of Responsibility (AOR), but is assigned an Area of Operations (AOO). The NORAD AOO extends into the AORs of Combatant Commands and is not geographically limited. However, once the specifics of an operation are known, the AOO will be defined during crisis action planning. The NORAD Area of Interest (AOI) consists of all aerospace and maritime approaches to North America and may be global in nature. Due to the unpredictable nature of contingency operations, the AOI may include nations and countries known to support or be sympathetic to terrorist groups or activities, as well as avenues of approach to Canada and the United States. The NORAD Terms of Reference defines North America as Canada. Alaska, the Continental United States, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands.

5. Role. NORAD is the bi-national command responsible to the Government of Canada, through the Chief of the Defence Staff, and to the Government of the US, through the Secretary of Defense, for the execution of missions assigned to NORAD. NORAD is composed of Canadian and US military forces working side-by-side for normal and contingency operations.

6. Mission. In close collaboration with homeland defense, security, and law enforcement partners, NORAD will prevent air attacks against North America, safeguard the sovereign airspaces of the United States and Canada by responding to unknown, unwanted and unauthorized air activity approaching and operating within these airspaces, and provide aerospace and maritime warning for North America. Specific missions and tasks include:

1. Aerospace Warning. Aerospace warning consists of the processing, assessing, and dissemination of intelligence and information related to man-made objects in the aerospace domain, and the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles, utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and agencies. An integral part of aerospace warning entails monitoring of global aerospace activities and related developments. The NORAD aerospace warning mission for North America includes aerospace warning in support of United States Combatant Commands responsible for missile defense.
2. Aerospace Control. Aerospace control is surveillance and operational control of the airspace of Canada and the United States. Operational control is the authority to direct, coordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise made available to NORAD.
3. Maritime Warning. Maritime warning consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating intelligence and information related to the respective maritime areas and internal waterways of, and the maritime approaches to, the United States and Canada. It also includes warning of maritime threats to, or attacks against, North America utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and agencies, to enable identification, validation, and response by national commands and agencies responsible for maritime defense and security. Through these tasks, NORAD shall develop a comprehensive, shared understanding of maritime activities to better identify potential maritime threats to North American security.
4. Security Operations. As identified in the following paragraphs, USNORTHCOM and Canada COM perform security tasks in support of civil authorities. NORAD, as a bi-national defense command, performs the missions specified in the NORAD Agreement and further amplified in the NORAD Terms of Reference. NORAD coordinates with agencies such as the RCMP in Canada and the FBI and Secret Service in the United States to ensure the performance of its defense missions complement the security objectives of the civil authorities.

USNORTHCOM

7. Authorities. CDRUSNORTHCOM authorities and responsibilities are outlined in federal statute (10 United States Code Section 164) and the President’s Unified Command Plan.

8. Area of Responsibility. The USNORTHCOM AOR includes air, land, maritime, and space approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida.

9. Role. USNORTHCOM is the combatant command responsible for carrying out assigned missions and tasks and planning for and executing military operations, as directed, in support of strategic guidance within the assigned area of responsibility.

10. Mission. USNORTHCOM anticipates and conducts Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned AOR to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests. Specific missions and tasks include:

1. Homeland Defense. Homeland Defense (HD) is “the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President “ (JP 3-27 “Homeland Defense”). All geographic and functional combatant commands, the Military Departments, and DOD elements contribute to the protection of the US homeland by conducting military missions overseas, sharing intelligence, and intercepting and defeating adversaries intent on attacking US territory.
2. Civil Support. Civil Support (CS) is “DOD support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities” (Joint Publication 3-28 “Civil Support”). CDRUSNORTHCOM conducts civil support operations, as directed by the President or SecDef, in the USNORTHCOM AOR to assist civil authorities in responding to disasters, emergencies, incidents, national special security events, or other special events covered in the National Response Framework. Additionally, civil support operations include day-to-day activities in support of law enforcement agencies, such as the detection and monitoring of international narcotics trafficking in the approaches and arrival zones.

Canada COM

11. Authorities. Canada COM authorities and responsibilities are outlined in the Chief of the Defence Staff Canadian Forces General (CANFORGEN) Message 012/06 CDS 007/06 311900Z Jan 06 which defined the command and control framework for Canada COM and assigned air force assets (less NORAD and CANSOFCOM), the six Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTFs), and their subordinate elements. Commander Canada COM exercises authority over all allocated units. Once approved, the CDS Directive on Canadian Forces Command and Control and Delegation of Authority for Force Employment, currently in advance draft, will replace CANFORGEN 012/06.

12. Area of Responsibility. The Canada COM AOR includes Canada, the continental United States, specifically the 48 contiguous states and Alaska, Mexico and the approaches to these same landmasses.

13. Role. Canada COM is the national military authority responsible for the conduct of all domestic operations for the defense of Canada and North America, less those operations executed under the direct command of the CDS or NORAD.

14. Mission. Canada COM will conduct operations to detect, deter, prevent, pre-empt and defeat threats and aggression aimed at Canada within the area of responsibility. When requested, Canada COM will provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management, in order to protect and defend Canada.

1. Defense Tasks. Canada COM will plan for and conduct operations for the defense of Canada, to include cooperation with the US for the defense of North America. It will detect, deter, prevent, pre-empt and defeat threats and aggression to Canada and North America. Canada COM will provide unity of command and execute command and control of all military efforts related to the defense of Canada within the Canada COM AOR (less NORAD operations). Canada COM will coordinate with lead federal departments for operational issues relating to defense/security of Canada and will provide the Canadian operational military link and coordination with USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Canada COM will coordinate Canada COM operational efforts with NORAD/CANR missions for operations in the same time and space.
2. Security Tasks. When requested and when appropriate, Canada COM will plan for and provide assistance to civil authorities in the form of emergency management tasks, crisis response, counter- terrorism support, support to major national security events, summits and conferences, and support to international sporting events and conventions. Canada COM will provide the primary operational link to federal OGD and applicable agencies as well as a regional link to Provincial Governments, Emergency Measures Organizations and applicable agencies through Regional Joint Task Force Headquarters.

Annex C – Organization Figures

Note – Commander USNORTHCOM is dual-hatted as Commander NORAD
Figure 1 - Governmental Relationships

 

Note – The three NORAD region commanders also serve as commanders of USNORTHCOM and Canada COM subordinate commands (see USNORTHCOM and Canada COM figures)
Figure 2 - NORAD

 

Note – Commander AFNORTH also serves as the USNORTHCOM JFACC, Commander CONR, and Commander 1^st Air Force (service force provider for USNORTHCOM). Commander JTF-AK also serves as Commander ANR and Commander 11^th Air Force who is assigned JFACC responsibilities for Alaska.
Figure 3 – USNORTHCOM

 

Notes – Canada COM CFACC also serves as Commander CANR and Commander, 1 Cdn Air Div. Commanders JTF Pacific and Atlantic also serve as Maritime Component Commanders. Commanders CANSOFCOM and CANOSCOM support Commander Canada COM when required.
Figure 4 – Canada COM

 

Annex D – Glossary of Terms

Note - These definitions are developed for use during the conduct of the Tri Command Study and are not intended to compete or conflict with national doctrinal definitions.

Defense – use of armed forces for the protection of sovereignty, territory, and population against external threats and aggression.

Security – use of the military at the request of civil authorities in support of public safety, domestic emergencies, law enforcement and other activities.

Supported Commander – A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task and receives support from one or more supporting commanders.

Supporting Commander – A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander.

Bi-national. A number of characteristics have been identified that distinguish a bi-national command. Those which are explicitly and implicitly conveyed include:

• One integrated command
• Command responsible to both countries
• Formed by both countries
• Missions assigned by both countries
• Pre-established, ongoing authorities in both countries
• Common architectures
• Common ROE
• Common procedures
• Ongoing right of passage authority
• Command may be supporting/supported to a national command
• Liaison with other government departments (OGD) is direct

Bilateral. The characteristics that distinguish a bilateral relationship include:

• Two cooperating national commands
• Commands responsible to own country
• Cooperation between countries
• Cooperative national missions
• Case by case authority in host country
• Compatible national architectures
• Compatible national ROE
• Coordinated procedures
• Requested right of passage
• Supporting/supported relationship not applicable between two national commands
• Liaison with OGD is through national command

Annex E – Intelligence and Information Sharing

1. Information and intelligence sharing among NORAD, USNORTHCOM, Canada COM, and their mission partners are critical enablers for a continental approach to defense and security. Although advances in technology have permitted improved sharing, the policies, nation-to-nation agreements, and military-to-military memoranda of understanding often do not keep pace with these changes.

2. Canada and the United States signed the Canada/United States General Security of Information Agreement (1962), which provided for the safeguarding of classified information communicated directly between Canada and the United States. This Agreement did little to improve intelligence or information sharing, since it was written for the protection of information, not the sharing of information. In addition, Canada and the United States still have no single, all-encompassing, Canada/United States information sharing agreement. It is therefore necessary to improve the CANUS military-to-military information sharing by developing or updating information protection and information sharing policies and exploiting the latest commercial technologies.

3. NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM receive intelligence and threat streams from a variety of sources, to include defense and non-defense agencies. Some of these organizations may not share the Commands’ desire to provide this intelligence or information in a RELCANUS default format. Therefore, if information or intelligence is deemed bi-nationally significant, it is a command responsibility (the requesting analyst in particular) to undertake the requisite measures to have the releasable portions of the information and intelligence reclassified as RELCANUS.

4. It is highly likely that, due to either the timeliness of the situation or security classification guidelines, some information will be unnecessarily classified US Secret NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals) or CEO (Canada Eyes Only). These safeguards should not negate the need to share releasable, mission essential information. Both countries should continue moving forward with their “write-to-release policies” enabling the maximum amount of information to be shared among defense partners.

5. In May 2004, the BPG hosted a Counter Intelligence and Law Enforcement (CI/LE) conference, with Canadian and US participants from intelligence, counter intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The participants identified seven key needs for interagency collaboration:

• National policy on release of classified information cross-border
• Defined and approved asymmetric threat intelligence requirements
• Reliable communication links between Canadian and US CI/LE organizations
• Central clearinghouse for CI/LE information
• Clear understanding of national/bi-national protocols and procedures
• Training on roles and responsibilities of Canadian and US CI/LE organizations
• Integrity of information sharing

6. The CI/LE needs that were identified reinforced the BPG’s findings on military-to-military information sharing as well:

• Information sharing between like organizations occurs, but often in ad hoc fashion (e.g., communications between CANUS maritime organizations occurs)
• Bi-national cross-functional and cross-border communications among air, land and maritime organizations is weak due to a lack of systematic processes
• There is a need for enhanced air and maritime domain awareness capabilities to provide increased situational awareness and shared information on potential threats through rapid collection, fusion and analysis
• CANUS cross-departmental communications between defense and other departments is not systematic. (A CANUS CI/LE community visualization tool was developed to help remedy these problems)

7. In an attempt to examine the information sharing environments in Canada and the United States, both countries previously conducted studies. These studies aimed at identifying gaps and seams with regard to information sharing domestically as well as bi-nationally in the new threat environment. Some of the applicable national findings are:

Canadian Study: A study on the structure and coordination of government identified several defense and security information-based opportunities for improvement.

• Greater need for Canada-US coordination
• Slow progress at information sharing
• Lack of surveillance coordination
• Information fusion failures
• Coordination lacking in coastal defence
• Canada is too inward-looking

To correct some of these shortcomings, the CF are expanding and enhancing their information and intelligence fusion capability to better assess large amounts of intelligence in support of military and government decision making. They are also improving coordination with other government departments and interoperability with allied forces, particularly the United States.

United States Study: The United States 9/11 Commission Report looked at the information flow within and among the federal agencies that had responsibilities before, during and after the terrorist attacks. The 9/11 Commission findings emphasized that:

• Information critical to informed decision-making was not shared among agencies
• There are no penalties for not sharing information
• Agencies uphold a “need-to-know” culture of information protection rather than promoting a “need-to-share” culture of integration

Although Americans often look to technology to fix systemic problems, the 9/11 Commission identified that technology, or a lack thereof, is not always the issue. Even though the United States has the most robust satellite communications system in the world, information was not shared among multiple agencies due to shortcomings in culture and other non-technical mechanisms.

8. The bottom line is that all agencies have a role to play. If our two sovereign nations do not share across the border, then we are creating gaps that can be exploited by the asymmetric threat. Similarly, it is no secret that actionable intelligence in the symmetric or asymmetric threat environment is enhanced by the exchange of information domestically as well as multi-nationally between Canada, the United States and other allies. The problem today is that the intelligence communities in both countries have to get used to working in a manner that is somewhat foreign to them